Semantics & Pragmatics SoSe 2023
Lecture 17: Presupposition

06/07/2023, Christian Bentz

Overview

Section 1: Recap of Lecture 16

Historical Overview

"[...] while it is no doubt true that the formal devices [of formal semantic frameworks] are especially amenable to systematic treatment by the logician, it remains the case that there are very many **inferences and arguments**, expressed in natural language and not in terms of these devices, which are nevertheless valid. [...] I shall therefore inquire into the general conditions that, in one way or another, apply to conversation as such [...]"

Grice (1975), p. 23-24.

Grice's Maxims

- ▶ The Maxim of **QUALITY**
- ▶ The Maxim of **QUANTITY**
- ▶ The Maxim of **RELATION (or RELEVANCE)**
- ▶ The Maxim of **MANNER**

Grice (1975), p. 26-28.

Failure to Fulfill a Maxim

There are different ways in which a participant of a communicative interaction might fail to fullfill a given maxim:

► They might **quietly violate a maxim**; in some cases, they will be liable to mislead.

► They might **opt out** from adhering to either the maxim, or the cooperation principle more generally (or both).

► They might be faced by a **clash**, i.e. it is impossible to adhere to one maxim without not adhering to another, e.g. a clash between Quality and Quantity.

► They might **flout** a maxim, that is obviously failing to fulfill it. If none of the above ways of failure to fulfill a maxim seems relevant, the hearer has to take this last possibility into account.

Grice (1975), p. 30.

Conversational Implicature

Conversational implicatures are a type of *pragmatic inference* about *what is said* by the speaker (literal meaning) in relation to what they actually *intend to convey* (communicative intention).

(1) A: Can you tell me where the post office is?
     B: I'm a stranger here myself.

Pragmatic inference by A:

► I assume that B is participating in a *rational conversation*, i.e. adhering to the cooperative principle and the maxims.

► B seems to be violating the maxim of relevance.

► We both know (it is part of our common ground) that strangers are unlikely to know the locations of particular places.

► I come to the pragmatic inference that the conversational implicature of B's statement is a more polite way of saying: "No, I cannot."

Kroeger (2019), p. 143.

Examples of Conversational Implicatures

Grice (1975), p. 31-37 gives a range of examples to illustrate the workings of conversational implicature. He therefore distinguishes three "groups" of conversational implicatures:

- ▶ **Group A**: Examples in which **no maxim is violated**, or at least in which it is not clear that any maxim is violated.

- ▶ **Group B**: Examples in which **a maxim is violated**, but its violation is to be explained by a clash with another maxim.

- ▶ **Group C**: Examples which involve **exploitation**, i.e. a *maxim is flouted* for the purpose of deliberately creating a conversational implicature.

Types of Implicature

The following types of implicature are discussed in Kroeger (2019), p. 146-147.

```
                          Implicature
                         /          \
              Conversational        Conventional
                /        \
      Particularized    Generalized
                        /    |    \
                   Scalar  Connectives  Indefinites
```

Particularized Conversational Implicatures

"[...] the intended inference depends on particular features of the **specific context** of the utterance."

Kroeger (2019), p. 146.

```
                  Implicature
                 /          \
      Conversational      Conventional
       /          \
Particularized  Generalized
              /      |        \
        Scalar  Connectives  Indefinites
```

(2)   A: Can you tell me where the post office is?
      B: I'm a stranger here myself.

(3)   A: C managed to brake his car and get arrested for arrousing public annoyance when he was drunk last night.
      B: Yeah, he is smart like that.

(4)   A: Where does C live?
      B: Somewhere in the South of France.

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Generalized Conversational Implicatures

"This type of inference **does not depend on specific features of the utterance context**, but is instead normally implied by any use of the triggering expression in ordinary contexts."

Kroeger (2019), p. 146.

We will discuss three subtypes of Generalized Conversational Implicatures here:

- ► **Scalar** Implicatures

- ► Implicatures of Sentence **Connectives**

- ► Implicatures of **Indefinite** Noun Phrases

Implicature
Conversational   Conventional
Particularized   **Generalized**
Scalar   Connectives   Indefinites

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Conventional Implicatures

"[...] **conventional implicatures** are part of the **conventional meaning of a word or construction**. This means that they are not context-dependent or pragmatically explainable [in contrast to conversational implicatures], and must be learned on a word-by-word basis."

Kroeger (2019), p. 148.

```
                    Implicature
                   /          \
      Conversational          Conventional
        /          \
Particularized   Generalized
               /      |        \
          Scalar  Connectives  Indefinites
```

(5) Susan was born in Stuttgart *and* Peter was born in Entringen.
     IMPLICATURE: – (natural language "and" is here used like $\wedge$).

(6) Susan gave Peter the key *and* Peter opened the door.
     GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE: She gave him the key *and then* he opened the door.

(7) Susan was born in Stuttgart *but* Peter was born in Entringen.
     CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURE: In contrast to what was said before, Peter was born in Entringen.[1]

---

[1] Remember that both *but* as well as *and* are translated into standard logic as $\wedge$.

Entailment, Presupposition, and Implicature

Given that we have established the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic inferences, **implicature** is one of several possible **linguistic inferences**. The others we will discuss are **entailment** and **presupposition**.

Inference
|
Linguistic Inference
/ | \
Entailment   **Presupposition**   **Implicature**
/   \
Conversational   Conventional
/   \
Particularized   Generalized
/ | \
Scalar   Connectives   Indefinites

Entailment

"**Entailment** is a type of [linguistic] inference. We say that proposition p "entails" proposition q if p being true **makes it certain** that q is true as well."

Entailments thus require that:

1. whenever p is true, it is logically necessary that q is also true;

2. whenever q is false, it is logically necessary that p is also false;

3. these relations follow from the meanings of p and q, independent of the context of utterance.

Kroeger (2019), p. 36-38.

Entailment: Examples

(8)   John *killed* the wasp. (lexical)
      ENTAILMENT: The wasp died.

(9)   I *broke* your Ming dynasty jar. (lexical)
      ENTAILMENT: Your Ming dynasty jar is broken.

(10) Hong Kong is *warmer than* Beijing in December. (comparative)
      ENTAILMENT: Beijing is cooler than Hong Kong in December.

(11) Ringo Starr is my *grandfather*. (lexical)
      ENTAILMENT: Ringo Starr is a relative of mine.

(12) John saw Mary and Bill. (logical)
      ENTAILMENT I: John saw Mary.
      ENTAILMENT II: John saw Bill.

(13) John saw *either* Mary *or* Bill. (logical)
      ENTAILMENT: John did not see both Mary and Bill.

Criteria and Tests

In the following, we establish a **battery of overall five tests**, which can be used to distinguish entailments from implicatures (and presuppositions in the next step).

Kroeger (2019), p. 151 pp.

	Entailment	Conversational Implicature[2]
a. Cancellable[3]	NO	YES
b. Suspendable	NO	YES
c. Reinforceable	NO	YES
d. Negation	NO	NO
e. Question	NO	NO

---

[2]Note that here only *conversational implicature* is included, as it is unclear whether *conventional implicatures* will behave the same, or whether these would rather fall with presuppositions.

[3]Also called *defeasible*.

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Test Summary

We then summarize the test results for each inference and compare it to the template given for **entailments** and **conversational implicatures** to decide if it falls in either category.

(14) John killed the wasp.
INFERENCE: The wasp died.

cancellable: NO
suspendable: NO
reinforceable: NO
preserved under negation: NO
preserved in question: NO

→ **entailment**

(15) A: I ran out of petrol.
B: There is a garage around the corner.
INFERENCE: One can buy petrol there.

cancellable: YES
suspendable: YES
reinforceable: YES
preserved under negation: NO
preserved in question: NO

→ **conversational implicature**

Section 2: Historical Background

Historical Background

> "[...] There is more literature on presupposition than on almost any other topic in pragmatics. [...] The volume of work is in part accounted for by a **long tradition of philosophical interest** [...] In addition presupposition was a **focal area in linguistic theory during the period 1969-76**, because it raised substantial problems for almost all kinds of (generative) linguistic theories [...]"
>
> Levinson (1983), p. 167.

Presupposition

Implicature

DRT

λ-Calculus   Montague Grammar

Type Theory

Predicate Logic

← 3rd century Propositional Logic

1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Frege's View on Presupposition

"If anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition[4] that the **simple or compound proper names used have a reference**. If one asserts 'Kepler died in misery', there is a presupposition that the name 'Kepler' designates something."

Levinson (1983), p. 169 citing Frege (1892), p. 69.

(16) Kepler died in misery.
      PRESUPPOSITION: The name 'Kepler' denotes an individual.

(17) Kepler did *not* die in misery.
      PRESUPPOSITION: The name 'Kepler' denotes an individual.

(18) *After* the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, ...
      PRESUPPOSITION: Schleswig-Holstein separated from Denmark.

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[4]Frege used the German term *Voraussetzung* here.

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Frege's View on Presupposition

Given these and further examples, Frege came to the conclusion that a theory about presuppositions would somehow integrate the following propositions:

1. **Referring phrases and temporal clauses** (for example) carry presuppositions to the effect that they do in fact refer,

2. A sentence and its **negative counterpart** share the same set of presuppositions,

3. In order for an **assertion** (as he put in the Kepler case) or a **sentence** (as he put in the Schleswig-Holstein case) to be either true or false, its **presuppositions must be true or satisfied**.

Levinson (1983), p. 170.

Section 3: Presupposition

Informal Definition

"As a first approximation, let us define **presupposition as information** which is **linguistically encoded** as being part of the **common ground** at the time of utterance [...] Speakers can choose to indicate, by the use of certain words or grammatical constructions, that a certain piece of information is part of the common ground."

Kroeger (2019), p. 40.

(19)   A: Kepler died in misery.
        B: I don't know who you are talking about.

Note: If we see Bs comment as a rejection of the presupposition "Kepler refers to something", then this is an instance of *presupposition failure* ("Kepler does not exist" would be the clearest case of rejection). If we see this rather as a request for clarification who Kepler is, then it would be *accommodation*.

Formal Semantic Background (Standard Logic)

(20) A: Kepler died in misery.
      B: I don't know who you are talking about.

Model $\mathbf{M}_A$

$D = \{e_1, e_2, e_3, \dots\}$
$I = \{\langle j, e_1\rangle, \langle p, e_2\rangle, \langle k, e_3\rangle, \dots, \langle D_1, \{\langle I(j)\rangle, \langle I(k)\rangle\}\rangle, \dots\}$
$I(D_1) = \{\langle I(j)\rangle, \langle I(k)\rangle, \dots\}$

Model $\mathbf{M}_B$

$D = \{e_1, e_2, e_3, \dots\}$
$I = \{\langle j, e_1\rangle, \langle p, e_2\rangle, \langle m, e_3\rangle, \dots \langle D_1, \{\langle I(j)\rangle, \langle I(m)\rangle\}\rangle, \dots\}$
$I(D_1) = \{\langle I(j)\rangle, \langle I(m)\rangle, \dots\}$

Translation key: j: John; p: Peter; k: Kepler; m: Mary, $D_1 x$: died in misery.

Common Ground

"The term **common ground** refers to everything that **both the speaker and hearer know or believe**, and know that they have in common."

This could include:

- ▶ **general world knowledge** of speaker and hearer (e.g. names normally refer to individuals),
- ▶ **knowledge observable in the speech situation** (e.g. what the speaker is wearing or carrying),
- ▶ **facts mentioned** earlier in the conversation.

Kroeger (2019), p. 40.

Formal Definition

"A statement A presupposes a statement B iff:

(i) if A is true, then B is true,

(ii) if A is false, then B is [still] true."

Levinson (1983), p. 175, citing Strawson (1952).

(21) Statement A: Kepler died in misery.
PRESUPPOSITION B: The name 'Kepler' denotes an individual.

(22) Statement ¬A: Kepler did *not* die in misery.
PRESUPPOSITION B: The name 'Kepler' denotes an individual.

Presupposition Triggers

Over the years, a large number of **presupposition triggers** have been identified (for English). These include but are not limited to:

(a) Definite descriptions:
   - ► definite noun phrases
   - ► possessive phrases
   - ► restrictive relative clauses

(b) Factive predicates

(c) Implicative predicates

(d) Aspecutal predicates

(e) Temporal clauses

(f) Counterfactuals

(g) Comparisons

(h) (Scalar terms)

Kroeger (2019), p. 43.

Triggers: Definite Descriptions

The usage of a **definite noun phrase** (just as the usage of a proper noun) presupposes that there is an individual that the noun phrase refers to. The usage of a **possessive phrase** presupposes the existence of the possessee. A **restrictive relative clause** presupposes the existence of an individual with a property described in the relative clause.

(23) The King of France is wise.
PRESUPPOSITION: There is an individual that is the King of France.

(24) My cat is wise.
PRESUPPOSITION: The speaker has a cat (i.e. there is a cat which is owned by the speaker).

(25) I'm looking for the man who killed my father.
PRESUPPOSITION: There is a man of whom it holds true that he killed the speaker's father.

Discussion Point

Take the following minimal pair of negated sentences:

(26)   I am not searching for **the** man who killed my father.

(27)   I am not searching for **a** man who killed my father.

Is there a difference with regards to the presupposition: "There is a man who killed the speakers father"?

Triggers: Factive Predicates

The usage of **factive predicates** (*regret*, *be aware*, *realize*, *be sorry*, etc.) presupposes that the proposition of the complement clause is true.

(28)　John *regrets* that he lied.
　　　PRESUPPOSITION: John lied.

(29)　The president is perfectly *aware* that lobbying is not legal.
　　　PRESUPPOSITION: Lobbying is not legal.

(30)　Jumbo *realized* that the mountain is insurmountable.
　　　PRESUPPOSITION: The mountain is insurmountable.

(31)　I *know* she is *appalled* that John lied.
　　　PRESUPPOSITION 1: She is appalled that John lied.
　　　PRESUPPOSITION 2: John lied.

(32)　I'm *sorry* for causing you trouble.
　　　PRESUPPOSITION: I caused you trouble.

Triggers: Implicative Predicates

So-called **implicative predicates** (*manage to*, *forget* to, etc.)
presuppose certain other predicates to hold true, (*try to*, *intend to*, etc.).

(33)   Mary didn't *manage to* come.
        PRESUPPOSITION: Mary *tried to* come.

(34)   John *forgot to* buy rice.
        PRESUPPOSITION: John *intended to* buy rice.

(35)   I'm sure John will *forget to* buy rice.
        PRESUPPOSITION: John *intends to* buy rice.

Triggers: Aspectual Predicates

Aspectual predicates express the *beginning*, *stopping*, *continuing* etc. of events. As such they also presuppose a certain status of the event at the time of speaking.

(36)   Mary *stopped* dating that cowboy.
        PRESUPPOSITION: Mary dated that cowboy.

(37)   My neighbour *has begun* doing sports regularly.
        PRESUPPOSITION: My neighbour hasn't done sports before.

(38)   Despite what the doctors said she *continues* to smoke.
        PRESUPPOSITION: She has smoked before.

(39)   We will *resume* classroom teaching.
        PRESUPPOSITION: We have done classroom teaching and then stopped doing it.[5]

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[5]This could potentially be split into two presuppositions: *We have done classroom teaching before*; *We stopped classroom teaching*.

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Triggers: Temporal Clauses

The usage of **temporal clauses** presupposes the truth of the subordinate clauses.

(40) *Before* I became a teacher, I worked as a chef.
PRESUPPOSITION: The speaker became a teacher.

(41) *After* we kissed everything changed.
PRESUPPOSITION: We kissed.

(42) *By the time* the company fired him, he had done the damage.
PRESUPPOSITION: The company fired him.

(43) *While* his wife was in hospital, John worked a 40 hour week.
PRESUPPOSITION: John's wife was in hospital.

Triggers: Counterfactuals

Counterfactuals presuppose that their antecedents (typically introduced with *if*) are false.

(44)   If I were king, I would paint all bridges pink.
       PRESUPPOSITION: The speaker is not the king.

(45)   If you had not written that letter, I would not have fired you.
       PRESUPPOSITION: You have written that letter.

However:

(46)   If it rains today, I will stay home.
       PRESUPPOSITION: # It does not rain today.

(47)   If you don't go, I won't go either.
       PRESUPPOSITION: # I will go.

Note: Having an antecedent with *if* in English is not a necessary condition for a counterfactual, rather, the past tense has to be used as well in the antecedent.

Triggers: Comparisons

Comparisons presuppose that the statement for which the comparison is formulated holds true for *the object of the comparison* (but not necessarily for the subject).

(48) Peter isn't as unreliable as John.
      PRESUPPOSITION: John is unreliable.

Note: Presuppostions in *as x as* constructions only seem to work when *x* is *not* about a clearly scalable property.

Discussion Point

Take the following comparisons:

(49) Peter isn't as old as John.
PRESUPPOSITION: ?John is old.

(50) Peter isn't as tall as John.
PRESUPPOSITION: ?John is tall.

(51) Peter isn't as smart as John.
PRESUPPOSITION: ?John is smart.

(52) Compared to yesterday, today was a successful day.
PRESUPPOSITION: ?Yesterday was not a successful day (at least when compared to today).

Are the presuppositions valid or pragmatically questionable (i.e. would have to be marked as #)?

(Triggers: Scalars)

Usage of **scalar terms** presupposes a particular status on the scale.

(53) Please, take *more* tea.
       PRESUPPOSITION: You already had some tea.

(54) Please, take *some* tea.
       PRESUPPOSITION: You haven't had tea.

Note: While Kroeger (2019), p. 40, takes the scalar term *more* as opening example to presuppositions, he does not further discuss scalar terms more generally as triggers. They are also not mentioned as triggers in Levinson (2008).

Section 4: Identification of Presuppositions

Entailment, Presupposition, and Implicature

Given that we have established the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic inferences, **presupposition** is one of several possible **linguistic inferences**. The others we have discussed are **entailment** and **implicature**.

Inference
|
Linguistic Inference
/ | \
Entailment   **Presupposition**   **Implicature**
/   \
Conversational   Conventional
/   \
Particularized   Generalized
/ | \
Scalar   Connectives   Indefinites

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Tests: Entailment and Conversational Implicature

The tests relevant to distinguish **entailments** from **conversational implicatures** are mainly the *Cancellation Test*, the *Suspension Test*, and the *Reinforcement Test*.

Kroeger (2019), p. 151 pp.

	Entailment	Conversational Implicature[6]
a. Cancellable[7]	NO	YES
b. Suspendable	NO	YES
c. Reinforceable	NO	YES
d. Negation	NO	NO
e. Question	NO	NO

---

[6]Note that here only *conversational implicature* is included, as it is unclear whether *conventional implicatures* will behave the same, or whether these would rather fall with presuppositions.

[7]Also called *defeasible*.

Tests: Presuppositions

The tests relevant to distinguish **entailments** and **conversational implicatures** from **presuppositions** are mainly the *Negation* and the *Question Test*.

Kroeger (2019), p. 152.

	Entailment	Conversational Implicature	Presupposition
a. Cancellable	NO	YES	sometimes[8]
b. Suspendable	NO	YES	sometimes
c. Reinforceable	NO	YES	NO
d. Negation	NO	NO	YES
e. Question	NO	NO	YES

---

[8]According to Kroeger (2019), p. 152, some presuppositions seem to be cancellable, "but only if the clause containing the trigger is negated. Presuppositions triggered by positive statements are generally not cancellable."

Example Utterances

Assume we have the three example utterances and respective inferences below. We will run through the different tests to establish whether these **inferences** are **entailments**, **conversational implicatures**, or **presuppositions**.

(55) John killed the wasp.
      INFERENCE: The wasp died.

(56) A: I ran out of petrol.
      B: There is a garage around the corner.
      INFERENCE: One can buy petrol there.

(57) John regrets that he lied.
      INFERENCE: John lied.

The Cancellation-Test

If the inference can be **cancelled** by the speaker **without creating a contradiction**, we say that the inference is cancellable.

(58) #John killed the wasp, but the wasp didn't die.
(cancellable: NO)

(59) There is a garage around the corner, but unfortunately you cannot buy petrol there.
(cancellable: YES)

(60) #John regrets that he lied, but he didn't lie.
(cancellable: NO)

The Suspension-Test

If an inference is not outright cancelled (i.e. said to be false) by the speaker, it is still possible to **"suspend" a commitment to the truth or falsehood** of the inference.

(61) #John killed the wasp, but I'm not sure if it died.
      (suspendable: NO)

(62) B: There is a garage around the corner, but I'm not sure if you can buy petrol there.
      (suspendable: YES)

(63) ?John regrets that he lied, but I'm not sure he lied.
      (suspendable: NO?)

The Reinforcement-Test

If the inference can be explicitly stated by the speaker **without creating redundancy**, then the inference is said to be **reinforceable**.

(64)   #John killed the wasp, and it died.
(reinforceable: NO)

(65)   B: There is a garage around the corner, and you can buy petrol there.
(reinforceable: YES)

(66)   #John regrets that he lied, and he lied.
(reinforceable: NO?)

The Negation-Test

If the inference is **preserved under negation**, then it is said to pass the negation test.

(67)   John did *not* kill the wasp.
       INFERENCE: #The wasp died.
       (preserved under negation: NO)

(68)   B: There is *no* garage around the corner.
       INFERENCE: #You can buy petrol there.
       (preserved under negation: NO)

(69)   John does not regret that he lied.
       INFERENCE: John lied.
       (preserved under negation: YES)

The Question-Test

If the inference is **preserved when a question is formulated** rather than a declarative sentence, then it is said to pass the question test.

(70) Did John kill the wasp?
      INFERENCE: #The wasp died.
      (preserved in question: NO)

(71) B: Is there a garage around the corner?
      INFERENCE: #You can buy petrol there.
      (preserved in question: NO)

(72) Does John regret that he lied?
      INFERENCE: John lied.
      (preserved in question: YES)

Test Summary

We then summarize the test results for each inference and compare it to the test-template (in the table above) to decide if it falls in either category.

(73) John killed the wasp.
INFERENCE: The wasp died.
_

cancellable: NO
suspendable: NO
reinforceable: NO
preserved under negation: NO
preserved in question: NO

→ **entailment**

(74) A: I ran out of petrol.
B: There is a garage around the corner.
INFERENCE: One can buy petrol there.

cancellable: YES
suspendable: YES
reinforceable: YES
preserved under negation: NO
preserved in question: NO

→ **conversational implicature**

(75) John regrets that he lied.
INFERENCE: John lied.
_

cancellable: NO
suspendable: NO?
reinforceable: NO?
preserved under negation: YES
preserved in question: YES

→ **presupposition**

Section 5: Accommodation and Failure

Informal Definition (repeated from above)

"As a first approximation, let us define **presupposition as information** which is **linguistically encoded** as being part of the **common ground** at the time of utterance [...] Speakers can choose to indicate, by the use of certain words or grammatical constructions, that a certain piece of information is part of the common ground."

Kroeger (2019), p. 40.

(76)   A: Kepler died in misery.
       B: I don't know who you are talking about.

Note: If we see Bs comment as a rejection of the presupposition "Kepler refers to something", then this is an instance of *presupposition failure* ("Kepler does not exist" would be the clearest case of rejection). If we see this rather as a request for clarification who Kepler is, then it would be *accommodation*.

Accommodation

It is a **common misunderstanding** about presuppositions that they *have to be* part of the common ground. This is not necessarily true. If it turns out that the presupposition is not actually part of the common ground, then hearers often **accommodate** in the sense of accepting the presupposition as true, or they might ask for confirmation to "officially" establish the presupposition as common ground.

(77)   A: My cat got stuck on the roof last night.
        PRESUPPOSITION: The speaker has a cat.

(78)   B (who doesn't know that A has a cat): Oh, I'm sorry to hear that. / Oh, you have a cat?

Presupposition Failure

Genuine **presupposition failure** only occurs when the hearer downright **rejects** the presupposition.

(79)   A: Take some more tea.
       PRESUPPOSITION: The hearer had some tea already.
       B: I actually haven't had any tea yet.

(80)   A: Are you a good witch or a bad witch?
       PRESUPPOSITION: The hearer is some kind of witch.[9]
       B: Who, me? I'm not a witch at all. I'm Dorothy Gale, from Kansas.

       Kroeger (2019), p. 44, citing from the movie *The Wizard of Oz*.

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[9]This is yet another kind of presupposition which we haven't discussed above. Also, it is a problematic one, as it doesn't preserve under negation: *You are not a good witch or a bad witch.*

Summary

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► **Presuppositions** are a third major category of **linguistic inference** besides *entailments* and *conversational implicatures*.

► They have been researched extensively in both the philosophy and linguistics (pragmatics) literature.

► They are associated with – and encoded by – certain **structural and lexical triggers** (e.g. definite descriptions, possessive phrases, temporal clauses, counterfactuals etc.)

► There are tests to distinguish them from *entailments* and *conversational implicatures*. In particular, the **negation and question tests**.

References

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Thank You.

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